"The following U.S. military report describing the German MP 44 assault rifle is taken from Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 57, April 1945."


"Machine Carbine Promoted M. P. 43 Is Now "Assault Rifle 44"


http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt07/stg44-assault-rifle.html

A question I've had for a while is "Why didn't the Allies think of/employ something like that?"

We did think of it (several times), but we didn't employ it very much. Doctrine was still adapting from the era of the Napoleonic-wars.

It was really the doctrine of go with what was proven and could be manufactured now. Look at the Sherman tank. Compared to the Panther and Tiger it was outclassed. But we were already set up to produce it as opposed to an untested untried design that would take more resources to convert factories to produce it.


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Despite the logistical problems the allied forces, especially U.S. units, seemed to think that the mix of semi-auto rifles, carbines, and full auto capable sub-machine guns and light machine guns was capable of getting the job done.   Most of what they fielded was battle proven gear, well supported by the supply chain.  M1 Garand rifle, M1 carbine, M1928 Thompson, M3 and M3A1 "grease gun", M1918 BAR A1 & A2 are the examples that come to mind.   

It was the Germans who really seemed to mix bolt guns and SMGs in a unit, which made sense.  Basically everyone was a packmule for MG-42 ammo, and spare gunners once the regular guys got shot.  Bolt rifles allowed some fire support and buzz guns gave the ability to lay down some lead if the enemy got really close.

I know there were a few generals who had a big mix of arms in infantry units but I recall reading and hearing that for the majority of fire teams everyone was supposed to have an M1 Garand, M1 carbines were in the hands of truck drivers, artillery men, and other less front line troops, plus front line NCOs.

Similarly, for front line infantry, you'd see the Thompson in the hands of NCOs and Officers, patrol leaders, and scouts, and the Rangers, but not your average front line infantryman.  If more buzzpower than a couple guys with M1 Garands could manage was needed, then you bring in the guy with the BAR  (and if a couple BARs couldn't, you bring in the M 1919 true machinegun), so the weapons mix wasn't as eclectic as it seems.  The exception would be when troops decided to, on their own, 'upgrade' to an M-1 carbine because it was lighter to carry.

Yup.  I recall hearing that in the European theatre weapons appeared in squads as if by "magic", especially if there were a few spares and enough ammo to keep them running.  I think some of the tank crews managed to have a few unauthorized goodies inside as well in case they had to hoof it.

So who coined the term Assault Rifle?

If you mean Sturmgewehr, wasn't it Hitler himself?

What's the bottom gun on Jesse's link?

Mike

It was really the doctrine of go with what was proven and could be manufactured now. Look at the Sherman tank. Compared to the Panther and Tiger it was outclassed. But we were already set up to produce it as opposed to an untested untried design that would take more resources to convert factories to produce it.


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I'm not sure I agree with that.

The M-4 wasn't stuck with because it was a tried and true tank at all.   In fact, after WW 2 stared but before we joined in, we designed the M-3 tank...which was an improvement on the M-2 from 1939, which, once the attack on France started, we said 'oh s___ our tanks are CRAP'.   So right from the beginning we were altering designs making them better, from the 'oh s___ it is CRAP M-2, to the Bizzare M-3, to the M-4.  Now, the M-4 was first put in the field it DID outclass the German tanks.  So we didnt' stick with it because it was tried and true even if inferior, we stuck with it because it was THE BEST.  It sent the Germans scurrying back to rush their own plans for a better tank out.  And then we no longer had the best.  But we didn't stick with the 'tried and true' M-4, we started throwing major upgrades at it, a couple different iterations of improved engines, a drastic change to how we did hulls - cast vs weld because weld was faster- and from a standard velocity 75mm main gun to a high velocity 76mm gun. I think there was an even dozen different upgraded models of the M4 (not counting the specialty vehicles built on the same frame) Clearly we weren't sticking to the tried and true, but improving on the fly with an eye toward how many units we could output per day. 

We actually said 'screw you tried and true!' and went with what was new and better or new and faster for production.

Additionally, even though we were constantly upgrading the M-4, when the original M-4 design was just two years old, we started on it's replacement. We actually upgraded the planned replacement as we upgraded the M-4.  Thing is, when we finally had the M-27 up and ready, the front line generals knew the M-4 wasn't a match for the Tiger, but thought that there were very very few Tigers hence decided to put the upgrading and replacement of other equipment first. 

It's noteworthy that prior to D-Day we could have had M-4s with the high velocity 76mm cannon, the same cannon that was on the M-27, but the Generals didn't want our tanks fighting German tanks, they wanted Tank Destroyers going after the German Tanks and Tanks going after infantry.  Part of the reason they passed on the 76 High Velocity upgrade for the M-4 prior to D-day and passed on the M-27 which also had the 76 Hi Vel cannon was because they thought a better tank killing gun on their own tanks would tempt troops to try and hunt tanks. Yes, this doesn't mix with our modern sensibilities of Tank vs Tank, but then the M-1 Garand was originally supposed to have a 10 or 12 or 15 round detachable box magazine rather than an 8 shot PING clip.

So, in summary, we never stuck with a design because it was 'tried and true', we instead continued to upgrade and replace with newer better models when we could, always looking to speed production.  We also passed on some smart upgrades and replacements not because the old stuff was 'tried and true' but for 'doctrine' reasons, sometimes doctrine reasons that would bit us in the ass later.

It's noteworthy that prior to D-Day we could have had M-4s with the high velocity 76mm cannon, the same cannon that was on the M-27, but the Generals didn't want our tanks fighting German tanks, they wanted Tank Destroyers going after the German Tanks and Tanks going after infantry.  Part of the reason they passed on the 76 High Velocity upgrade for the M-4 prior to D-day and passed on the M-27 which also had the 76 Hi Vel cannon was because they thought a better tank killing gun on their own tanks would tempt troops to try and hunt tanks. Yes, this doesn't mix with our modern sensibilities of Tank vs Tank, but then the M-1 Garand was originally supposed to have a 10 or 12 or 15 round detachable box magazine rather than an 8 shot PING clip.

So, in summary, we never stuck with a design because it was 'tried and true', we instead continued to upgrade and replace with newer better models when we could, always looking to speed production.  We also passed on some smart upgrades and replacements not because the old stuff was 'tried and true' but for 'doctrine' reasons, sometimes doctrine reasons that would bit us in the ass later.

The whole story can be had in good detail in David Johnson's book, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers.  The U.S. Army's armored divisions, and thus tanks, were envisioned for use in the exploitation and pursuit roles formerly performed by the horse cavalry.  Thus they were given tanks designed for high mobility and mechanical reliability.  The job of killing tanks was seen as one for self-propelled tank destroyers and the towed AT guns of infantry regiments.  This doctrine was finalized by LTG Leslie McNair after the Louisiana and North Carolina Maneuvers.  McNair was also the major drag on getting the M26 to Europe sooner.

The problem of the inadequacy of the Sherman's main gun, as noted, was known prior to D-Day, but for most of the war was always buried under other, larger problems.  It didn't even come to Eisenhower's attention until, IIRC, some time after the Battle of the Bulge, by which time it was largely a moot point.

On the subject of the Army's interest, or lack thereof, in the Stg. 44 or something similar after the war, I find it odd, as well.  About a year and a half ago, I was doing some preliminary research for a potential paper on the influences of the Army's institutional culture on small arms adoption, especially rifles.  I looked through Infantry magazine, 1945-1950, and I was very surprised to find no articles or even letters to the editor on the subject of 'assault rifles.'  The only item I could find that called for newer, better small arms called for new machineguns. (As awesome as JMB's machinegun designs -M1917, M1919, and M2 -  were, they were still made to be fired from the tripod, and even the bastardized M1919A6 was horrible awkward for offensive use.  So no surprise that men who'd gone up against the MG-42 thought the Army needed a new medium MG.)